Systems Metaphysics: A Bridge from Science to Religion by Zwick, Martin
Portland State University
PDXScholar
Systems Science Faculty Publications and
Presentations Systems Science
6-2007
Systems Metaphysics: A Bridge from Science to Religion
Martin Zwick
Portland State University, zwick@pdx.edu
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/sysc_fac
Part of the Metaphysics Commons, and the Philosophy of Science Commons
This Presentation is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Systems Science Faculty Publications and
Presentations by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Citation Details
Zwick, M. (2007) "Systems Metaphysics: A Bridge from Science to Religion." Metanexus conference: Transdisciplinarity and the
Unity of Knowledge: Beyond the Science and Religion Dialogue. June 2-6, 2007; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
SYSTEMS METAPHYSICS: 
A BRIDGE FROM SCIENCE TO RELIGION 
Abstract 
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May 25, 2007 
'Systems theory' is familiar to many as the scientific enterprise that includes the study of 
chaos, networks, and complex adaptive systems. It is less widely appreciated that the 
systems research program offers a world view that transcends the individual scientific 
disciplines. We do not live, as some argue, in a post-metaphysical age, but rather at a 
time when a new metaphysics is being constructed. This metaphysics is scientific and 
derives from graph theory, information theory, non-linear dynamics, decision theory, 
game theory, generalized evolution, and other transdisciplinary theories. These 'systems' 
theories focus on form and process, independent of materiality; they are thus relevant to 
both the natural and social sciences and even to the humanities and the arts. Concerned 
more with the complex than the very small or very large, they constitute a metaphysics 
that is centered in biology, and thus near rather than far from the human scale. 
Systems metaphysics forges a unity of science based on what is general instead of what is 
fundamental; it is thus genuinely about everything. It counters the nihilism of narrow 
interpretations of science by affirming the link between fact and value and the reality of 
purpose and freedom in the natural world. It offers scientific knowledge that is 
individually useful as a source of insight, not merely societally useful, as a source of 
technology. With the new world view that it brings, systems metaphysics contributes to 
the recovery of cultural coherence. It builds a philosophical bridge between science and 
religion that is informed by our understanding of living systems. It suggests a secular 
theodicy in which imperfection is lawful yet perfecting is always possible, and uses this 
perspective to analyze religions as systems. It provides scientific insights into traditional 
religious concepts, including those ideas that guide spiritual practice. 
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1. Systems Metaphysics 
1.1 The systems project 
2 
The systems project crystallized in the post-World War II period around theories 
about automata, information, feedback control, open systems. decision-making, games, 
learning, and other subjects. It consisted of general systems theory, cybernetics, and 
operations research. Contemporary studies of complexity - of chaos, networks, adaptive 
systems, etc. - are a 'renaissance' of this project. For brevity, the label 'systems theory' 
is used here to refer to the achievements of this entire scientific enterprise.· Although, to 
be precise, one should really speak of systems theories, in the plural, these theories have a 
common character and reflect a common perspective. They are transdisciplinary, being 
more abstract and general than specific scientific theories but less abstract and general 
than mathematics and philosophy. They are components for an 'exact and scientific 
metaphysics' (Bunge, 1973) that is currently being developed but still awaits a full 
articulation. 
'Metaphysics' here means an account of the most general features of the world (i.e., 
it does not refer to an inquiry about God, free will, or the soul). An 'exact metaphysics' 
is one that is mathematical. A 'scientific metaphysics' is one that is grounded in, i.e., 
draws upon and contributes to, the sciences. An exact and scientific metaphysics thus 
seeks a two-fold truth: it attempts to satisfy both the rational standard of coherence and 
the empirical standard of correspondence, while being also meaningful and generative. 
Concerned more with the middle scale than the very small or very large, this metaphysics 
privileges biology over physics. It reflects the radical (though once traditional) view that 
it is the general and not the fundamental that is 'about everything.' While the current 
fragmentation of science cannot be remedied by promissory notes - never redeemable -
of the in-principle reduction of other sciences to physics, it can be remedied by a systems 
metaphysics that brings new understanding of scientific knowledge. 
Unity of science based on systems metaphysics is only a possibility, not yet an 
actuality, but the systems project is already the interdisciplinary movement in the 
sciences. While integration by reduction can be achieved locally between vertically 
adjacent fields of science - this is what 'consilience' (Wilson, 1998) is about - a truly 
unitary view of the world requires a different approach, one that accords full ontological 
status to systems at all scales. Graph theory, information theory, nonlinear dynamics, 
feedback control, game theory, and the like are the lingua franca of theory in all the 
sciences. Familiarity with these theories is widespread, but what is still missing is the 
recognition of their underlying commonality: they organize knowledge around form 
rather than matter (they are in the tradition of Pythagoras rather than Democritus) and 
around isomorphism and emergence rather than reduction. They are thus relevant not 
only to the natural and social sciences but to the humanities and the arts as well. 
The potential role of systems theory should not be exaggerated. The systems 
program is an auxiliary·enterprise that complements mainstream science. Universities 
will never be reorganized along Pythagorean lines and systems categories - order, 
dynamics, information-processing, morphogenesis, agency, adaptation, etc. -will never 
supplant the conventional materiality-based organization of scientific knowledge. 
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Systems theory is too abstract to be more than supplementation. But this supplementation 
is needed for the continued development of science and for its successful application to 
human needs. Science now encounters major difficulties arising from the exponential 
growth of.knowledge. Even within the same field scientists often cannot understand one 
another. There is little integration across scientific disciplines, and virtually none 
between science and other aspects of culture. Technology steadily advances in power 
and its applications are uncontrolled. 
A systems metaphysics cannot solve these problems but it can contribute to their 
amelioration: (a) it provides a new way to integrate and understand scientific knowledge; 
(b) it reveals the deep connection between fact and value; ( c) it formulates scientific 
knowledge that can be personally appropriated. These potential contributions to science 
and our relation to science open up a new basis for the science-religion dialog. 
1.2 Understanding what we know 
Systems theory offers a view of the world that is more encompassing than any view 
provided by physics. From a physics-based 'theory of everything,' one would get only a 
theory about things that physicists study. To our understanding of life and human society 
and our natural environment, such a TOE would add nothing. Unity of science cannot be 
gained by learning the fundamentals of physical reality; it can only be based on general 
principles that apply to all types of systems. By unifying science in this way, systems 
metaphysics gives us a new understanding of what we already know. One does not need 
to descend to the quantum level to see the world differently, and the distinctive features 
of quantum mechanics are largely irrelevant to the middle-scale domain in which we live. 
Consider instead the implications of simply understanding the world in terms of the 
categories of (a) matter, energy, information, and utility, (b) structure, function, and 
history, and (c) the actual and potential. These notions are central to systems thinking 
(Gerard 1958; Miller 1978; Kauffman 2000). Truly assimilating them would transform 
our sense of the world. 
If matter is viewed in the light of its informational and functional aspects, our 
conception of materiality is radically altered. To give only one illustration: oxytocin is a 
hormone having a particular chemical structure. Functionally it is relevant to maternal 
emotion and possibly other bonding experiences, but its material structure reveals nothing 
about this significance. What is salient about oxytocin is its external function, not its 
internal structure, and its function is informational. If one had a notion of materiality that 
encompassed its functional and informational aspects, one might speak of oxytocin as 
exemplifying, as it were, a 'higher type' of materiality. This kind of thinking is 
illustrated in anthropology by the idea of Levi-Strauss (1966) that the distinction between 
'the raw' and 'the cooked' parallels the distinction between nature and culture. What is 
cooked undergoes material transformations whose cultural significance confers a social 
function on cooked food. Of course, cooking also has a biological function; what is 
uncooked may be inedible. Functional considerations are usually considered in 
philosophical analysis to be inessentjal because they are external, but why should the 
essential only be internal; why should it not also involve the interactions of an entity with 
its environment? In the systems view, what something is involves both structure and 
function, and also history. While 'being a food' depends on the presence of an organism 
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of an appropriate species, why shovld this dependence make 'being_ a food' a non-
essential property? What i~ the difference, after all, betw~en 'potential food' versus 
'actual food' and 'potential energy' versus 'actual (kinetic) energy'? In both cases, the 
transition from potential to actual is contingent on external factors. At issue here is the 
distinction, articulated by Galileo and Locke and now central to the reductionist 
paradigm, between 'primary' and 'secondary' qualities. This distinction has validity, but 
it needs to be supplemented by its complementary opposite. If something is defined not 
only by structure but also by function, and not only by matter-energy, but also by 
information, hormones are not merely molecules and cooking is not merely molecular 
reorganization. 
The systems view also challenges other scientific orthodoxies. For example, just as 
it is possible to over-emphasize structure and take the interactions of an entity with its 
external environment as irrelevant to its being, or over-emphasize function and regard the 
internal nature of an entity as infinitely plastic, it is also possible to have a "single vision" 
- to borrow Blake's (1802) criticism ofNewton - that overemphasizes history, and the 
ideographic (contingent) character of history at the expense of its nomothetic (lawful) 
character. (One can also have a narrow vision by underemphasizing history.) An 
overemphasis on history is illustrated by the insistence of Gould (1995), Margulis (1998), 
and other evolutionary theorists that biological evolution exhibits no progress and 
nothing justifying any vertical (higher vs. lower) ordering of species or other taxons. In 
the words of Margulis, 
"All beings alive today are equally evolved. All have survived over three thousand million 
years of evolution from common bacterial ancestors. There are no 'higher' beings, no 
'lower animals' ... Even the 'higher' primates are not higher. We Homo sapiens sapiens 
and our primate relations are not special, just recent; we are newcomers on the 
evolutionary stage. Human similarities to other life-fonns are far more striking than the 
differences." 
This is only a partial truth. It privileges history over structure and function, the 
contingent over thefawful; and similarity over difference. The historical view of life as a 
branching tree (or bush) is a great achievement of evolutionary theory, and it is true that 
the genetics and biochemistry of all forms of life show overwhelming similarity. The 
human genome is not very different from the genomes of single-celled organisms, and 
very close to that of our primate relatives. But if 'higher' means more complex, 
autonomous, potent, extensively and diversely interacting, sustained by greater energy 
throughput, and capable of more refined levels ofinforrnation processing, can it be 
denied that, structurally and functionally, single-celled eukaryotic organisms are 'higher' 
than prokaryotic bacteria, that animals having nervous systems are higher than animals 
which do not, and that human beings are higher than other primates? Is the human 
species which creates and lives in the informational realm of culture, which theorizes 
about the origins of the universe, which manipulates massive amounts of energy and 
minute specimens of matter, and which alters its environment on a planetary scale, not 
'higher' than a bacterial species? 
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Overemphasizing history is often associ~ted with the denial of 'essences,' i.e., with 
the nominalist as opposed to the realist philosophical position. If 'essence' means 
something fixed and unitary, then historicity and multiplicity do indeed imply that there 
are no essences. But if e~sence just, means deep as opposed to surface structure, then 
diachronic change and heterogeneity do not invalidate the idea of essence. A species 
genotype is an essence. Species evolve, yes; they are instantiated in actual populations, 
yes; but within-species and temporal genomic variation do not negate the fact of 
between-species variation. Essences can be fuzzy rather than crisp (and fuzzy sets and 
relations are important components of systems theory). Structure is the residue of 
history. When structure is differentiated into a relatively fixed homogeneous core and a 
relatively variable heterogeneous periphery, when this core supplies the algorithmic 
information for the whole structure, one can legitimately speak of essence. Arguments 
against essences are ideological, not scientific. 
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'Progress' does not mean replacerpent that is monotonic or irreversible. It does not 
imply a sequence of levels free of ambiguity. It means the incessant emergence of ever 
more complex, autonomous, potent, and interacting forms, having new capacities to 
utilize matter, energy and information. 'Progress' in this sense is undeniably an aspect of 
evolution. While the specific character of these forms is contingent, since they first arise 
through mutation and other random processes, their general character is lawful, since 
there are many paths to the order needed by organisms, and this order exists in the realm 
of the possible before it is attainea in the realm of the actual. As Wright {2000) argues, 
while the evolution of particular species having intelligence was not preordained, the 
emergence of intelligence per se probably was implicit in the evolutionary process 
(disregarding the possibility of a life-extinguishing global catastrophe). Complex forms 
when they arise do not supplant simpler forms but supplement them, and while there is no 
one-dimensional scale of being that is sequentially traversed in evolutionary history, the 
distinction between higher and lower forms is an obvious and necessary part of any 
understanding of life. 
The tendency in certain expositions of science to overemphasize randomness or 
misconstrue its significance need's to be corrected. If, for example, a random collision of 
two gas molecules causes one to occupy a higher energy state, one could say that this 
state was randomly produced, but the availability of an unfilled higher energy level pre-
exists the random event. The possible, not only the actual, is real, especially the "adjacent 
possible" (Kauffman 2003), which might instead be ca1led the 'potential,' since the 
facilitating environmental conditions (here, the temperature of the gas) make the event 
more than merely possible. Another illustration of this point: if a box containing two 
initially separated bar magnets is shaken, the magnets will accidentally meet and stick 
together. One could say that the resulting magnet pair arose randomly, but this account 
would be so incomplete as to distort the truth. It would ignore the fact that the stuck-
together magnets form a lower-energy and thus more stable structure. Disorder (here, 
random shaking) actualizes order. Prigogine and coworkers (Nicolis & Prigogine 1977) 
have promoted this idea - "order through fluctuations" in the realm of non-linear 
dynamics and open systems far from equilibrium. 
- ~, " ... 
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Evolution is commonly explained in terms of random variation and specific selection 
plus heritability, but this explanation is incomplete. It is only functional-historical; it 
largely ignores structure and assumes in effect a limitless internal plasticity. Yet the 
phenomenon of convergent evolution, for example, shows that variation and selection do 
not fully account for the outcomes of evolution. Insistence on the importance of structure 
was recognized long ago by Whyte (1965) and has been argued extensively by Kauffman 
(1993) in his "order for free" ideas. Of course, a structural component - the necessary 
third aspect of the theory- is now included in the neo-Darwinian synthesis, the work of 
Mendel and Weismann having been vastly augmented by the discoveries of molecular 
biology. If the structural component is given its full due, the significance of random 
variation appears in a new light. It is chance joined to necessity (Monod 1972) that 
creates new order, and necessity means not only selection but structural and dynamic 
stability. Random variation is a mechanism integral to open-ended evolutionary search, 
and this search is over a space of pre-existing possibilities, some of which are favored 
energetically or dynamically (Bronowski 1970). The overemphasis on randomness in 
some popular descriptions of evolution seems ideologically motivated: a random universe 
is a meaningless one, and some scientists, feeling themselves still locked in a struggle 
with religion, delight in the assertion of meaninglessness. Other scientists indulge in the 
opposite error of assuming total determinism; this also implies meaninglessness, with all 
due respect to Spinoza's heroic efforts to find meaning in such a world. But the fact of 
the matter is that the world is neither totally random nor totally determined, and the 
possibility of meaning arises precisely because of this. Recognition of this fact is salient 
in systems theory, for example in ideas (e.g., Langton 1992) about the significance of 
"the edge of chaos" (although chaos is not randomness). 
1.3 Fact and value 
A systems perspective also challenges the venerable separation of fact and value. 
Between the two, under the aspect of difference, there is indeed a sharp distinction and 
thus "perfect continence," to use the expressive phrase of Spencer-Brown ( 1969), but 
under the aspect of similarity, the two interact in a complex way that is not at all sterile. 
To use a visual metaphor from nonlinear dynamics, one might say that while fact and 
value are different domains of discourse, the two domains are 'strange attractors' whose 
basins of attraction (spheres of influence) interpenetrate in complex ways. 
Systems metaphysics brings fact and value into close relation. One way that it does 
so is via components that are both descriptive and normative. For example, decision 
theory and game theory are descriptive theories about the ways that rational agents act in 
situations of risk, uncertainty, and competition/cooperation, but they are also normative 
theories about how agents should act in such situations. These theories provide a 
language in which complex questions about value, and even ethics, can be clarified by 
being posed exactly. Another example is the Theory of Social Choice (Blair and Pollak 
1983), which derives from Arrow's finding of the impossibility of achieving rationality, 
equality, and decisiveness in certain voting or multiple-attribute decision-making 
situations. Arrow's result is embodied in a descriptive theory that also has normative 
implications for social decision-making procedures. 
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Being centered in biology rather than physics, systems metaphysics situates itself 
squarely in that realm in which issues of value arise explicitly. In the pheno,menon of 
life, value emerges in a world of fact. Values have causal powers, and the preconditions 
and consequences of this emergence are proper scientific issues. That is: a 'living system' 
is a system that has 'interests' (Kauffman 2003). The notion of' interests' is addressed 
scientifically by 'utility,' the central concept of decision theory and game theory. Fitness 
is a specific biological type of utility, namely the 'interest' of leaving offspring. Living 
systems would be incomprehensible without the idea of fitness, and from an evolutionary 
perspective, fitness defines the ground of value. Yet reproduction is not actually where 
value first emerges. Jonas (1966) philosophically and Kauffman scientifically argue for 
the priority of metabolism, or more abstractly, autopoiesis, i.e., the self-making and self-
maintenance of certain open systems far from equilibrium. By satisfying the dynamic 
and thermodynamic conditions for the persistence of form despite and in fact precisely 
via the flux of substance, being is asserted and value is realized. Beyond the values of 
self-maintenance and reproduction, there are other values. There is an ensemble, perhaps 
a hierarchy, of types of value or utility, just as form can be conceived as the bottom level 
of a hierarchy of information, which includes catalytic, genomic, hormonal, neural, and 
other types of information. ('Value' and 'utility' are related but not equivalent, but it 
would go too far afield to distinguish here between them.) 
Associated with utility is the notion of 'purpose,' also related to the idea of 'norm.' 
A norm is exemplified by a set-point that specifies the equilibrium state of a feedback 
system. (In general, though, equilibrium states of dynamic systems are not norms, since 
attractors of dynamic systems are specified implicitly and non-locally.) Norms make 
sense in terms of the utility that they secure, and to Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow 
(1943), 'purposefulness' was thus explained by negative feedback. This is a satisfactory 
account of only one type of purposefulness, but other control mechanisms also exist, e.g., 
the feedforward regulation described by Ashby (1976). Purpose is also implicit in 
decision theory and game theory - utility being that which rational agents try to secure or 
maximize. Genetic algorithms, which operationalize a systems theoretic 'generalized 
evolution,' provide a mathematical treatment of purpose in the context of optimization. 
One might construct a hierarchy of purposefulness, analogous to the hierarchies of 
information and utility already mentioned. Feedback and feedforward control might be 
the simplest types of purposefulness at the bottom of this hierarchy, but these would be 
inadequate to describe purposefulness at the human level, as Jonas ( 1966) has argued. 
Purposefulness is thus the subject of several systems theories, and well within the realm 
of science. This was not always so. When vitalists argued that the ideas of Newtonian 
mechanics were inadequate to account for purpose, they were right, although their own· 
explanations Of purpose were scientifically vacuous. 
One might speak even of 'freedom.' Jonas suggests that 'freedom' first appears in 
living systems in the phenomenon of metabolism or autopoiesis. In the sub-organismic 
world, being reRuires a union of specific matter with form, but in organisms form 
becomes liberated from specific matter, and identity, i.e., .essence, comes to inhere in 
form itself. (Here 'form' isn't only static but includes dynamic process.) Form must still 
be materially instantiated, so organisms continually produce themsefves from the flux of 
matter-energy that passes through them. But in freedom from a fixed material basis, life 
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oecomes completely dependent on this flux, so freedom, in this sense, comes at the price 
of vulnerability. Living systems gain and indeed require a mode of being that is active 
rather'than~passive, both internally and externally .(active self-producing requires the 
selective ingestion of 'food'). With the acquisition of the power of locomotion, which 
occurs even in single-celled organisms, freedom from a fixed environment is achieved, 
and the powers of the organism are augmented. One might speak further of freedom 
made possible by the capacity to take in from the· environment and process, not only 
matter-energy, but information. Freedom is relative, not absolute, but the concept is 
applicable, though a more modest terminology might instead speak of living systems as 
'autonomous.' One can imagine a hierarchy of different types of freedom or autonomy, 
like the hierarchies of information, utility, and purpose mentioned above. These 
hierarchies are linked, and a framework of this sort cast in the language of 'energies' is 
proposed in the philosophical-religious writings of Bennett (1961 ). Bennett (1956) also 
suggests a related tripartite classification of systems: the autonomic (organismic), the 
hyponomic (sub-organismic, the micro realm of matter-energy), and the hypernomic 
(cosmological, the macro realm of matter-energy). Roughly speaking, matter is salient in 
the hyponomic realm; energy is salient in the hypemomic realm; and information is 
salient in the autonomic realm. From a cosmological perspective, the hypemomic is 
active, the hyponomic is passive, and the autonomic reconciles. 
Systems theory not only helps us think in new ways about familiar facts, and 
counters the narrowness of received opinion, but may stimulate new explorations and 
discoveries. Given that the category of utility augments those of matter, energy, and 
information, one wants to go further. Matter, energy, information, (norm,) utility, 
... what? Matter and energy carry information; information carries utility; what might 
utility carry? If matter-energy is adequate for the material realm, and information spans 
the material and the living realms but is more visible in the latter, and utility is distinct to 
the realm of the living, are there further realms and, if so, what categories are basic to 
them? There is at least one obvious other realm: just as life emerges from matter, mind 
emerges from life, so one might ask: what new scientific category will be central to some 
new scientific theory that helps us to understand mind not merely as information 
processing but as subjective experience? Despite major advances in cognitive science, 
what science has to say about this question is meager. Midgley (1992) offers an 
intriguing speculation linking utility and subjective experience: consciousness might be 
an evolutionary emergent that enables agents to deal with collisions of values. 
The possibility of.new scientific categories yet to be discovered is not an idle reverie. 
Theories of matter, of the 'stuff of the universe, go back very far-to the Greek atomists 
at least. Although ideas about energy may have been implicit in early philosophy or pre-
scientific thought, only with the development of thermodynamics in the 19th century did 
the notion of energy emerge clearly. Until the mid-20th century, there was no formal 
concept of information in the natural sciences or of utility in the biological and social 
sciences. In information theory and game and decision theories: there now exist exact 
and scientific notions of information and utility. It is hard to imagine not having these 
ideas at our disposal, but it is only about 50 years ago that they first became available. 
Surely there will be other general ideas which future theories will formalize (make exact) 
and operationalize (make scientific). What will they be? 
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Value is centraLto the humanities and the arts, and systems theory connects science 
to these domains. This is possible because systems ideas apply not only to concrete 
systems but also to abstracted and conceptual systems, i.e., to systems abstracted from or 
not even grounded in material reality. Systems theories have the broad scope inherent to 
mathematics, but being less abstract than mathematics, they address themes that are 
ubiquitous in human experience, such as order and disorder, dynamics, representation, 
communication, differentiation and integration, and conflict. Connections to the arts and 
humanities have been made in various ways. Ideas of entropy, information, and order 
have been applied to communication and form in the arts (Moles, 1966; Arnheim, 1971). 
Ideas from nonlinear dynamics have been used in literary studies (Hayles, 1990). 
Computational approaches to art have been pursued; for example, evolutionary 
algorithms have generated visual and musical forms. Advances in artificial intelligence 
and artificial life have enhanced animation and special effects in the film industry. 
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This only briefly samples connections between systems theory and the arts and 
humanities. Connections go deeper than diverse borrowings and influences. Efforts to 
develop a general theory of systems have been paralleled by similar aspirations in the 
humanities. Modern social and literary 'critical theory' (Calhoun 1995; Culler 2000) and 
the movements of structuralism (Caws 1998) and semiotics (Hervey 1982) represent 
comparable efforts to achieve coherence in the social sciences, humanities, and arts. 
Sometimes referred to simply as 'theory,' this project seeks to occupy an intermediate 
niche between the abstract fields of linguistics and philosophy and concrete fields such as 
literature, political theory, psychoanalysis, and feminism. Resemblance to the niche that 
exact and scientific metaphysics seeks to occupy is plain: linguistics plays the role of 
mathematics as the means by which the world is modeled; the fields of literature, etc., 
play the role of the different scientific disciplines to which transdisciplinary theory is 
applied. The two projects - systems theory in the sciences and 'theory' in the humanities 
and 'human sciences' -have more in common than analogous placement of their 
epistemological niches. The structuralism of Piaget (1970) overlaps considerably with 
systems theory, and information theory is an important component of semiotics. 
In both systems theory and structuralism/semiotics, there is a pervasive abstraction. 
There is the same flirtation with the denial of objective reality and the affirmation of the 
arbitrariness of models; i.e., the abandonment of ontology in favor of the exclusive 
concern with epistemology, as if one could have one without the other. The 
'constructivist' positibn is widely held within the systems community; Ashby (1976), 
who stressed the 'relativity' of models, was perhaps in this camp. Both movements share 
Spinoza as a 'patron saint' philosopher. But there is at least one major difference 
between the two: critical theory and postmodern Theory are highly political. While one 
can no doubt find in systems theory some ideological presuppositions and agendas, they 
are less salient than the hegemony of feminism, Marxism, and other ideologies in post-
modern thought. This crucial difference makes a productive interaction between the 
systems theory and post-modernism unlikely, although interaction continues. The shift 
from structuralism and semiotics to deconstruction has been a shift in the direction of 
skepticism, nihilism, and obscurity; this limits the fruitfulness of the interaction. 
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1.4 Personal knowledge 
"The ancient desire was surely a quite different one. It was a desire for kinds of 
explanation that are both much wider and more immediate." - Midgley (1992) 
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"Very general metaphysical views ... are not just inert factual propositions which we might 
accept without altering our attitudes or policies. They speak to our imaginations in a way 
that changes our world-pictures. They affect our symbolism. They reshape the framework 
of our thought. They shift our mental postures. They affect that whole vital central area of 
human life which connects thought, feeling and action. Though they are not themselves 
value-judgments, they do much to determine our value-judgments." - Midgley (1992) 
Systems theory offers a type of scientific knowledge that can be appropriated by 
individuals as "personal knowledge." This phrase derives from Michael Polanyi (1958) 
who observed that the personal aspects of scientific knowledge are often ignored by 
philosophers and historians of science, since science for them is quintessentially a 
collective enterprise. While scientific knowledge is necessarily personalized to a degree 
by working scientists, this is rarely true for scientific knowledge possessed by people in 
general. Except where such knowledge touches upon a person's work or hobbies or upon 
the education of children, it is received as news from a distant domain, as intellectual 
stimulation or as a harbinger of economic or medical advances, but in no way as 
personally meaningful. In the discovery of research and its application in technology, 
scientific knowledge is societal. It is the· basis of economic activity and it plays a cultural 
role. It is too specialized, however, to be personal. It is isolated from other sources of 
human knowledge: from religion, literature and the arts, and politic.s. While science is 
done by individuals, the knowledge it produpes is not used by individuals, except for the 
professionals who do research or develop technology. 
A major reason for this is that knowledge is specialized, and thus is usable only by 
specialists. Moreover, it is specialized in a particular way: it is materially-organized, that 
is, scientific knowledge is associated with different types of matter, and most forms of 
materiality occur in domains distant from ordinary human life. We have no direct access 
to the stars, to the molecules in our body, to the crustal plates of the earth; we do not 
interact with clouds. Knowledge about ~tars, molecules, crustal plates, and clouds cannot 
be personal. By contrast, systems knowledge, is about form and process in general, and 
everything that we have personal conta,9t with exemplifies one or more archetypal 
patterns. We have access, not only intellectually but also experientially, to order and 
disorder, variety and constraint, predictability and unpredictability, complexity, 
morphogenesis, goal seeking and adaptation, competition and cooperation, system 
formation, and so on. 
Systems knowledge is thus closer and more accessible to us in one way, but it is 
more distant from us in another: its abstraction makes it unfamiliar and difficult. But 
imagine if in our schooling, we were initiated into these ideas and trained in their use, not 
as an alternative to standard science, but as a supplement to it. Perhaps we might then be 
able to perceive, in our interactions~ with one another, with the natural world, and even 
internally within ourselves, the archetypes of networks, variety and constraint, openness 
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and closedness, feedback, differentiation and integration, hierarchical order, competition 
and cooperation, etc. Systems knowledge could then become personal knowledge. 
The concrete facts of science are fascinating, but have no ~irect usefulness for us. 
The abstract principles of systems theory are no less interesting to those with a taste for 
abstraction, but do have implications and utility. Indeed, we might pose the following 
question to our educators. 
Which is it actually more important to learn: 
• that what explains the world are its fundamentals, e.g., superstrings - or - that what 
explains the world are its most general features, e.g., order and distinction; 
• that atoms are made up of protons, neutrons, and electrons, and protons and neutrons 
are made of quarks - or - that all things are both wholes and parts and that 
wholeness and partness are always in tension; 
• that weather is produced by masses of air at different pressures and temperatures in 
complicated interactions with one another - or - that unpredictability in phenomena 
can be due to random external perturbations or deterministic internal chaoticity; 
• that the excess phospbates dumped into lakes cause eutrophication - or - that all 
systems pollute, i.e., excrete disorder into their environment, and that these waste 
products can be neutralized only by their assimilation in cycles on a larger scale; 
• that genetic information is carried in DNA or RNA by specific nucleotide sequences 
of adenine, thymine/uracil, guanine, and cytosine - or - that information is coded in 
patterns of matter and/or energy; 
• that hanging, swinging, and dimpled chads can mess up elections - or - thf;It the 
instantiation of information in patterns of matter or energy is never functionally 
perfect; 
• that viruses inject their DNA or RNA into cells and by doing so take over cellular 
metabolism - or - that the distillation of an informational domain distinct from its 
matter-energy base opens up the possibility of parasitism; 
• that bacteria inoculated into a nutritive medium grow exponentially but eventually 
level off at some population size - or - that growth in many systems (biological, 
social, technological, etc.) is dominated first by positive and then by negative 
feedback, which usually produces an S-shaped growth curve; 
• that volcanoes and earthquakes are the result of collisions of large tectonic plates 
moving on the surface of the earth - or - that open systems far from equilibrium 
spontaneously reach critical states where sudden changes occur unpredictably at 
many scales; 
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• that the evolutionary record shows massive biological extinctions in various specific 
geological periods - or - that punctuated equilibria can occur even from internal 
causes in a dynamic system at the edg~ of chaos; 
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• that it is difficult to prevent overgrazing in land held in common - or - that there are 
many situations in which individual rationality produces coJlective irrationality; 
• that suppression of fires build up a large flammable base which can fuel more severe 
fires, and the overuse of antibiotics leads to the evolution of resistant strains - or -
that interventions in complex systems often produce counter-intuitive effects, 
sometimes even exacerbating the very conditions intended to be alleviated; 
• that medicine X designed to counter disease Y has unfortunate 'side effects' on organ 
Z - or - that one can never do just one thing and 'side effects' are never avoidable. 
Many more such paired alternatives could be cited. 
The study of scientific fact contributes to the growth of knowledge, but the study of 
scientific principle contributes to the development of understanding. There can be power 
in knowing the fundamental and there can be wisdom in understanding the universal. 
There is more than enough power in the world, but not enough wisdom. 
Imagine one of the above ideas - that individual rationality can lead to collective 
irrationality (the prisoner's dilemma)- effectively taught in all elementary and high 
schools. Imagine as a consequence that in a new generation this archetypal non-zero sum 
game was easily and rapidly recognized. Imagine that instead of the fruitless tension 
between the injunctions of "looking out for number 1" and "doing what society says is 
right," there was a real appreciation of dilemmas of collective action; that instead of the 
habit of blame in conflict there was an understanding of how the structure of situations 
binds the actors involved; that instead of the naive belief in preordained harmony 
between individual self-interest and the common good there was the more sophisticated 
realization that in some situations there is such harmony but in other situations there isn't. 
Would this not be a significant contribution to the moral education of our children? 
Imagine that a second systems idea - the limits of exponential growth, which is 
summarized in the S-shaped growth curve - was effectively taught in al I elementary and 
high schools. Is it not likely that this would provide some of the public understanding 
and support that is needed to confront and respond to the ecological and environmental 
challenges that now threaten the planet? Would this not be a significant contribution to 
the welfare of our children, and of future generations? 
Multiply this many-fold with numerous other systems principles. Deepen this with 
the understanding that these are the gener~l archetypes that govern both the harmony and 
the disharmony of the world. Provide practice in the application of this understanding to 
both ourselves and the world, to both the subjective and objective realms. Would not an 
exact and scientific metaphysics contribute enormously to real education? 
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2. A Bridge from Science to Religion 
Systems metaphysics has irpplications for the science-religion dialog: (a) it offers a 
'secular theodicy'; (b) it suggests groun~s for dialog beyond the usual ideas drawn from 
physics; ( ~) it points to the quasi-scientific character of some religious practice. 
2.1 Secular theodicy 
"Perfection is not of this world." - Ali (founder of Shi'a Islam) 
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"It is impossible for a man not to be part of Nature and not to undergo changes other than 
those which can be understood solely through his own nature and of which he is the 
adequate cause." - Spinoza, Ethics 
Systems theory offers an ontology of problems that is a 'theodicy,' but a secular one 
(Zwick 1984, 1995, 2000). Traditionally, theodicy is the reconciling of divine justice and 
divine power with the reality of evil, the word 'evil' being used not narrowly as an 
epithet for wrongful' human action ('moral evil'), but broadly to include suffering, decay, 
imperfection, and death ('natural evil'). It is one of the major attractions of a scientific 
metaphysics that it offers an account of the origins and nature of evil, cast in general 
terms and linked to scientific understanding. 
Literally, of course, a 'secular theodicy' - one expressed scientifically - is a 
contradiction in terms, ,as reference to divinity has long been abandoned in scientific 
discourse. Yet if we no longer feel a religious contradiction in the existence of evil in a 
divinely-created order, there still is a need for explanation and consolation, which are 
also functions oftheodicy. Systems idea; can contribute to an explanation of human 
suffering in terms of the universal character, the 'lawfulness' as it were, of the difficulties 
that afflict systems. 
In a reductionist metaphysics, a theodicy is impossible. The problem of evil is 
divided into smaller unconnected problems, and at the level of elementary particles, it 
disappears. Evil is not a well-posed problem in physics and from its fundamental point of 
view is illusion. The systems view "saves the phenomena" and provides a general 
explanation of evil, i.e., of precariousness, dysfunction, and suffering. Central to this 
view is the recognition that constraint is a property of the cosmos on all levels. In 
Kabbalistic metaphysics, constraint is 'severity,' which is intrinsic to - indeed the price 
of- existence. Scholem (1991) writes in "Sitra Ahra: Good and Evil in the Kabbalah", 
" ... But the act of tsimtsum itself, in which God limits Himself, requires the establishment 
of the power of Din, which is.a force of limitation and restriction. 
Thus the root-0f evil ultimale1y lies in the very nature of Creation itself, in which the 
harmony-0f the Infinite cannot,:by definition, persist; because of its nature as Creation -
i.e., as other than Godhead- an element of imbalance, defectiveness, and darkness must 
enter lnto every r.e~tricted existence, however sublime it may be. It is precisely the 
rigorously theistic tendency ofLurianic Kabbalah that requires evil as a factor necessarily 
inherent in Creation per se, without which Creation would necessarily lose its separate 
existence and return to being absorbed in the Infinite." 
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It is surely a stretch to give mathematical interpretations to Kabbalist ideas, but, 
encouraged by Boulding's injunction that systems thinkers should not be afraid to appear 
ridiculous and by his personal example of boldness, consider the following: tsimtsum, in 
terms of the set-theoretic definition of constraint, is the necessary diminution of the 
possible in the actual: there is no order, i.e., coherent existence, without constraint, 
without the exclusion of possible states. Or, in terms of the system-environment 
distinction, tsimtsum is incompleteness, the 'constriction' or limitedness of a system 
within its context. Every system exists within some larger environment. This is to apply 
Lurianic ideas to individual systems, not to creation as a whole. 
Constraint is opposed by variety, which is not inherently different from disorder, 
which is another source of imperfection. So all systems are subject to the dual and 
conflicting imperatives of constraint and variety, order and disorder. While it is possible 
to reconcile these imperatives, each of which in isolation causes evil, reconciliation 
cannot be guaranteed. A systems theodicy declares the universality- really, ubiquity - of 
this and many other tensions within systems: incompleteness vs. inconsistency, rigidity 
vs. flexibility, openness vs. closedness, autonomy vs. interdependence, etc., yet does not 
assert the impossibility of balancing these contrary tendencies and needs. It locates 
imperfection in the very structure of existence, but it does not preclude it being 
ameliorated- at least temporarily and locally. 
If a systems theodicy provides a 'defense of God' by explaining evil and suffering as 
inevitable components in the natural order, it also provides a 'defense of Man' against the 
charge, made by western and eastern religious doctrines, that evil and suffering is 
fundamentally of human origin, due to action or ignorance. This accusation blames the 
victim. Although some victims are blameworthy and even victims have responsibilities, 
what original sin there is in humanity only exemplifies the more general sin of origin that 
is common to all being, the imperfection that afflicts all creation that has its basic source 
infinitude. 'Sin' - in Hebrew, 'missing the mark' - always comes with origin, i.e., with 
exisfence, reflecting the necessary incompleteness and inconsistency of all things. To 
give a more balanced view, though, finitude is also original virtue, a manifestation of the 
good that also blesses existence. 
Imperfection is not merely the inadequate instantiation of form by substance. It is 
not only, as Plato held, that matter is recalcitrant and embodies form only approximately. 
Form is recalcitrant as well; both are afflicted with the consequences of finitude. It was 
once believed that.perfection and simplicity ofform were reflections of the divine, but 
there were. always counter-indications. The Pythagoreans suppressed their discovery of 
the irrationals. Kepler was forced to sacrifice the beauty of his Platonic solids model of 
the solar system, as well as the perf~ctron of the circle, in favor of the mathematically 
inelegant ellipse, which ~o distressed Kepler that he referred to it as a 'cartful of dung' 
(Koestler 1959). In our own time, ·a vision of a perfectly orderly world of form was 
sought by Whitehead and RusselHn their Principia Mathematicq (1910), but this vision 
was decisively undermined by Gode l's theorem, the implications of which are still 
unfolding. It is commonplace now to note imperfections in the world of form and 
incapacities of human reason. G~e theory, the Arrow Impossibility Theorem, and the 
theory of computational complexity reveal limits to order and rationality. Cybernetics 
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shows that signal and noise, representation and illusion, are not intrinsically 
distinguishable. Chaos demonstrates that complexity is implicit in simplicity and severs 
the connection between determinism and predictability. If the forms are in the heavens, 
there is strife there as well. 
This is not cause for alienation. We are at home in the universe not only because the 
order within is isomorphic to the order without, as Hermetic philosophy asserted, but also 
because the disorder within is isomorphic to the disorder without. As limited wholes, we 
are simulacrums of the larger whole. Our flaws are lawful; they echo the flaws of the 
cosmos, and in this isomorphisms of negative qualities, there is also meaning. Of course, 
strictly speaking, the very idea of 'flaw' ('evil') is necessarily relative to entities with 
'interests,' i.e., living systems, but this does not make the 'imperfection' of the cosmos a 
'secondary' quality that can be dismissed as inessential. 
To use the terminology of theodicy, what is being discussed here is 'metaphysical 
evil.' Leibniz held that metaphysical evil was the basis of both 'natural evil' and 'moral 
evil' (Neiman, 2002), and the Kabbalist and dialectical position advocated here supports 
this view. More precisely, metaphysical evil encompasses natural evil, and natural evil 
encompasses moral evil. Metaphysical evil is the most general conception, and includes 
natural evil as concrete instantiation. Natural evil includes moral evil because humanity 
is part of the natural order. Both of these inclusions reflect the aspect of isomorphism, 
i.e., similarity, but under the aspect of difference, specifically emergence, moral evil is 
also a special case, because humans have unique capacities and thus also responsibilities. 
Human beings are both part of the natural order and unique, a dual affirmation well 
articulated by Jonas (1966). 
Referring moral evil back to natural evil, and natural evil back to metaphysical evil, 
is, one must admit, a kind of 'reductionism' (though it might be called 'expansionism' or 
'upwards reductionism'). It represen~, as all reductionisms do, a dissatisfaction with 
multiplicity. But tracing evil back to its metaphysical origins does not allay this 
dissatisfaction, because multiplicity rules in the heavens as well. Evils have not one but 
many metaphysical essences, so what is really gained by a metaphysical account over an 
ethicist's newspaper column or a radical's manifesto? Two answers can be given to this 
question. First: essences are deeper (higher in the 'upwards' metaphor) than appearances, 
so it behooves us to grasp them. Second: one can in fact give a unitary account of 
metaphysical evil. Lurianic Kabbalah offers such a view. Related to this view is the 
quote from Spinoza that opens this section: metaphysical evil has its ultimate source in 
incompleteness, in the finitude of every "mode," i.e., system. The quote speaks of the 
fate of man, but this is to give concrete expression to what is really an abstract 
proposition: every mode is finite - has an environment - and thus is not the adeguate 
cause of its own fate. Spinoza's philosophy - except for his determinism - is a systems 
metaphysics, as Jonas (1965) has noted (Jonas characterized it as a "philosophy of 
organism"). Incompleteness, the necessary affliction of wholeness, which manifests in 
both internal constraint and external limitation, is the most general explanation for evil. 
A systems ontology is Leibnizian in its exposition of metaphysical evil, but anti-
Leibnizian in its implications. Leibniz held this to be "the best of all possible worlds" -
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with emphasis on "possible" for which he was deservedly mocked by Voltaire. The 
systems view is the opposite of this: perfection is not of this world, but perfecting is. The 
world is perfectible, probably indefinitely so. This means that it is never the best that is 
possible - in game-theoretic language, games are very rarely zero~sum and conditions are 
hardly ever Pareto-optimal. But perfecting is not guaranteed by history, as Hegel and 
Marx thought, since contingency is real. The task of perfecting (in Kabbalah, tikkun) is 
in the hands of life, and more specifically, human life. Imperfection. in the human sphere 
is partially and provisionally remediable; we can affect and are thus accountable for the 
quality of our own domain of existence. Many aspects of the natural order that cause 
suffering are also corrigible. Though we are not to blame (but merely partake in it), we 
are still responsible. By accepting this responsibility, we become the mediating factor 
through which polarities may be integrated and transformed. We are charged with the 
rectification of creation and our actions have metaphysical significance. 
Tikkun begins at home, with the religious traditions themselves, which are systems of 
thought and practice in the real world and thus necessarily imperfect. This does not mean 
that jufit the followers of the traditions are imperfect; the traditions themselves are flawed. 
This is plain from any historical or scientific perspective. A systems theodicy implies the 
need of each tradition to face its errors and distortions. No religion is truly universal: 
each is a mixture of the universal and the unique, and suffers the contradictions that this 
entails; and each is incomplete. Every uniqueness needs other types of uniqueness the 
realm of the sacred is an ecosystem, not a single species - and so "religious pluralism is 
the will of God" (Heschel 1996). All religions navigate clumsily the conflicting demands 
of variety and constraint, openness and closedness, rigidity and flexibility, centralization 
and decentralization. All encompass more than what can be consistently organized, and 
so all are afflicted by contradiction. All were fixed in some deep way, for good and bad, 
by their origins. All, in some places at some times, turned into their opposites. The 
acceptance of the fact of imperfection and the value of pluralism are bitter pills for any 
tradition to swallow, but this acceptance is crucial to rectify tradition and ease relations 
between religious civilizations. The contrary belief- in the perfection of tradition or of 
the central figures of tradition is a form ofidolatry. That imperfection and fallibility 
must be accepted is a central spiritual lesson of modernity and science. 
2.2 Sacred isomorphisms 
"As his books show, Davies1s claim [that 'science offers a surer path to God than religion'] 
depends on treating virtually all religious questions as depending on cosmological 
propositions centering on the Big Bang. But actually, not many questions of general 
importance do depend on views about that bang, however big ... Most religious questions 
arise within human life and begin by asking about its immediate meaning ... Our 
metaphysical ideas are rooted in the life that we know." - Midgley (1992) 
Systems metaphysics has relevance to religion beyond the secular theodicy it offers. 
It is instructive to think about this in the context of the many connections to religion that 
have been claimed for modern science and especially for physics. Religious significance 
has been seen, for example, in speculations about the origin of the universe and in the 
exquisite match between the values of the fundamental physical constants and the values 
necessary for a cosmos to support life (the anthropic principle). Similarities have been 
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noted between quantum theory and the reports of mystics. Human consciousness has 
been asserted to be implicated in quantum measurement, and there is much talk about 
classical and quantum 'levels of reality.' 
17 
While such claims are intriguing, their scientific merit is uncertain; more critically, 
their spiritual significance is not substantial. These ideas ,appeal because they make us 
comfortable. They tell us that we Jive in a universe that is not alien but precisely tailored 
to our existence. They reassure us, despite our experience to the contrary, that reality at 
its deepest level is a seamless and harmonious web. Or, they feed fantasies of self-
importance: we ourselves reduce the cosmic wave function and our very own glorious 
'consciousness' creates the universe. They declare the limitlessness of our power by 
telling us that we tap into a primal subatomic energy. They flatter us by suggesting that 
we are the equals of the mystics because our quantum theory also speaks about the unity 
of existence. It is interesting to note that the extreme inflation of our importance implicit 
in these ideas is the mirror image of the extreme deflation of our importance that is the 
message of fundamentalist secularism. 
These are ideas that are conducive to reverie, solipsism, and self-satisfaction, not to 
objectivity, presence, and effort. At best, they undermine narrow models of the world, 
nourish our sense of wonder, and provide a scientific hint, however metaphorical and 
remote, of important truths not encompassed by the dominant scientific world view. At 
worst, however, they are moral distractions, spiritual soporifics, and breeding grounds of 
intellectual dishonesty. They allow us to repress the humiliations of the Copernican, 
Darwinian, and Freudian discoveries. While they foster hope of regaining the coherence 
of the medieval world view that was undermined by science, this hope is misplaced. 
Attempts to find religious implications in physics are a sign more of the wish for 
reconciliation between scic;nce and religion, than of any progress already made towards 
such reconciliation. Little progress has actually been made, and the reason for t~is is 
plain: the ideas of modern physics are weakly connected to human experience. 
Another reason that little progress has been made is that attempts to reconcile science 
and religion have often tried to establish a link between science and belief in God. This 
line of inquiry is virtually certain to have limited productivity. The history of attempted 
proofs of the existence of God lacks convincing success, and it is unlikely that science 
can assist in such efforts. Admittedly, the anthropic principle is suggestive of the classic 
"argument by design" once central to natural religion, but it hardly qualifies as a proof. 
This exception notwithstanding, for a productive dialog to occur between science and 
religion, the position of methodological atheism (Habermas 2002) has to be adopted, 
since 'God talk' is inherently outside any scientific framework. To be more precise: 
bridges built from s,cience towards religion must reflect this position, but this constraint 
doesn't apply to bridges bullt in the other direction. · 
What is required from science is something different: a metaphysics not distorted by 
materialistic reductionism. In this new metaphysics, physics needs to be displaeed by 
biology as the science most relevant to a new world view. A philosophy of biology needs 
to be developed that corrects the tendentious denial of progress and the exaggerated 
emphasis on randomness that currently characterizes our understanding of evolution. The 
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philosophical .implications of autopoiesis, the significance of the augmentation of the 
categories ,of matter and energy wlth those of information and utility, the inherent link of 
fact and value in the domain of life, the scale of complexity and potency 'that qualitatively 
differentiates living forms, the emergent and strictly immanent 'design' of evolutionary 
processes channeled by the "adjacent possible,", the natural emergence of mind, the 
evolutionary ratchet of altruism - these and many other systems-oriented themes are far 
more important to the science-religion dialog than speculations on the origins of the 
universe or strained imaginings of a "God of the gaps" who silently intervenes in the 
interstices of natural processes. We feel the absence of a world view "Tis all in pieces, 
all coherence gone" Donne (1611) wrote - and we hope that this coherence might be 
recovered by science itself. This hope may be justified, but quantum mechanics, particle 
physics, and cosmology are the wrong places to look. The right place to look is to a 
metaphysics linked to mathematics and science and oriented towards the general, not the 
fundamental, the metaphysics whose construction is underway in the systems project. 
A metaphysics that accords "ontological parity" (Ross 1980) to phenomena on all 
scales could promote a modem equivalent of the integration of science and religion that 
occurred in Pythagorean thought and later also permeated the origins of science as it 
emerged from its Western religious matrix. The systems view reasserts the Hermetic 
principle, "As above, so below": the laws governing different domains of existence are 
the same, not in the sense that everything is reducible to physics and is just the play of 
elementary particles, but in the sense that there are universal structures and processes, 
extensive isomorphisms, that exist between many kinds of systems. Scientific knowledge 
was once partially organized in this way, and by virtue of this mode of organization, it 
was not set apart from other forms of human knowledge. It might be so again. Perhaps 
the laws of the macrocosm (the universe) are in some ways isomorphic with the laws of 
the microcosm (the human being); with such isomorphisms (not yet available) a 
reconciliation of science and religion would become imaginable. 
But the isomorphisms of contemporary science depict a cosmos that is different from 
the Pythagorean and Hermetic visions. Beyond the geometry of simplicity, of spheres 
and triangles, we now have a geometry of complexity, of mountains and trees, a fractal 
geometry of nature. Beyond statics, which can yield simple musical analogies about 
harmonious ratios, we have nonlinear dynamics, which can offer isomorphisms with the 
complexity of Bach. The older views were too simple; they overemphasized harmony, or 
they assigned harmony to the heavens and discqrd to earth. The world is not strictly 
harmonious; i;ior is it only a vale of tears. It is a blend of the harmonious and the 
disharmonious; or, in contemporary systems terms, it is at the edge between order and 
chaos. Where these opposites meet or are joined together, there is hazard, and it is not 
as Plato asserted - that there is perfectibn at the higher levels and hazard only at the 
lower ones; there is hazard all the way up. On the opposite side of hazard is opportunity; 
there is no hazard if nothing important is at risk. Any reality-based theodicy must 
acknowledge the compelling fact of hazard in the world. 
The systems theory literature often touch,es upon religious themes. Deutsch, in his 
classic Nerves of Government (1966) speaks eloquently of 'faith,' 'love,' and 'spirit' 
within the framework of cybernetic ideas. For Deutsch, religious commitment requires a 
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kind of closedness but responsiveness to the present r9quires openness; having a 
harmonious balance between the two is perhaps 'grace.' Beyond metanoia, individual 
spiritual work, there is also tikkurz, redeeming social action in the world, and many 
systems ideas are relevant to su.ch action. For example, Boulding's work on conflict and 
cooperation (1962) and Axelrod's The Evolution of Cooperation (1984) show how game-
theoretic ideas bear significantly on moral issues and bridge the divide between fact and 
value. 
The systems view privileges form and process over substance, wholes over parts, and 
emergence over reduction. It accords ontological status to systems at all scales, to 
function as well as structure, and to the possible as well as the actual. There are also 
other compatibilities and links between systems ideas and the religious traditions. 
Systems theory models gradations of purposefulness. It sees planetary life as a self-
·regulating whole that arises from and has significance in a cosmological context. The 
"edge of chaos" idea allows one to model the union of order and creativity in nature. 
Boulding' s hierarchy of systems types (1956) is in effect a scientific reformulation of the 
"great chain of being" (Lovejoy 1936). The triad of matter, energy, and information 
echoes the three gunas of the Samkhya tradition of India. The noosphere ofTeilhard 
(1959) exists in rudimentary form in the Internet, and the distance between certain 
conceptualizations of 'angel' and the idea of 'meme' is not so great. Numerous other 
religious ideas have systems-theoretic cognates. Systems metaphysics could be central to 
a new world view that has extensive and subtle religious implications. 
2.3 Inner science 
There is an intimate connection between systems theory and religion that is more 
than purely philosophical or theological: systems ideas resemble conceptions that have 
guided religious practice. In the Pythagorean and Hermetic traditions, theory expressed 
in analogies and open to experiential verification gave spiritual practice a partially 
scientific character. For example, alchemy as a psychological-spiritual pursuit was inner 
inquiry guided by an elaborate and emotionally rich system of chemical metaphor (Jung 
1983). For those alchemists who were seeking something other than wealth, processes 
such as fixation, volatilization, and sublimation had symbolic and not literal meanings; 
they were not about ordinary materiality. Consider for comparison Langton's'(l 992) 
analogy between the phases of matter and different attractor types in dynamic systems: 
systems with fixed point or limit cycle attractors and thus short transients are 'solids'; 
systems with chaotic attractors and long transients (but short ones viewed statistically) 
are 'gasses.' The similarity between this analogy and alchemical analogies may be 
distant, since psyches are much more complex than simple dynamic systems (as is 
represented in Boulding's'hierarchy of system types), but the point is this: symbols, 
analogies, and isomorphisms all reflect the same systems-theoretic mode of thought. 
Symbols have the greatest subtlety and range, isomorphisms are the most exact, and 
analogies are somewhere in-between. 
Burkhardt (1960) in his description of alchemy writes, "In this way too the alchemist 
works. Following the adage solve et coagula, he dissolves the imperfect coagulations of 
the soul, reduces the latter to its materia, and crystallizes it anew in a nobler form." To 
express this in systems language, the alchemists were engaged in a psychic process of 
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simulated annealing, which is a method of global optimization formalized by statistical 
mechanics. In simulated annealing, dissolution and coagulation are done to get beyond 
local optima. More generally, the separation of an informational domain from a matter-
energy base is central to life and exemplifies alchemical distillation and etherialization; in 
spiritual work these processes describe the separation of consciousness and attention 
from thought and sensitivity. 
Certain aspects ofreligious traditions and spiritual disciplines resemble scientific 
investigation. They involve "inner sciences," centered in the empirical experimentation 
of individuals, undertaken in a community of 1 ike-minded investigators, and supported by 
relevant theory (Zwick 1985). The experimental subject in these sciences is oneself, as is 
the experimenter; methods of research and knowledge gained from research can hardly be 
more personal than this. While theory provided by religious texts is primarily concerned 
with the psychological and spiritual, it often has a wider scope. Insofar as spiritual 
practice is guided by principles that apply to phenomena both internal and external and at 
different scales, and insofar as this theory could be or already is systems-theoretic, there 
is a link between modern science and those aspects of spiritual traditions that are partially 
scientific in character. In these inner sciences, theory must be personally appropriated if 
it is to have any value; for this reason it is sometimes veiled, so discovery is not short-
circuited, investigation is not biased by expectation, and knowledge is not mistaken for 
understanding. This mode of acquiring self-knowledge differs from introspection, which 
does not have an experimental component. It differs also from therapy in the greater role 
of the subject/object of research and the lesser role of its guide (teacher, therapist), but all 
self-knowledge requires the active efforts of those who wish to acquire it. To some 
extent, this kind of self-study also resembles phenomenological investigation (Husserl 
1965), but it exceeds the latter in its ethical dimension, interpersonal collaboration, 
tradition of theory, participation of the body, and generally in its greater scope. 
Theories in the inner sciences often employ the symbolism of number to structure 
analogy. Chinese philosophy emphasized "correlative tabulations," i.e., analogies across 
different domains of the natural and social order (Needham 1956); Chinese medicine, 
Taoist meditation, and t 'ai chi share with this philosophy some common theoretical ideas. 
A systems-theoretic version of such number symbolism is Bennett's "systematics" 
(1966), which can be considered an application of graph theory to the composition and 
decomposition of ideas. For example, the 'tetrad' is a four term system describing 
'activity,' especially purposeful activity. Its terms are ground, goal, direction, and 
instrument; or alternatively: actual, ideal, theoretical, and practical. The cyclic structure 
actual-tideal-ttheoretical-+practical(-+actual) captures the flow of many-problem-
solving activities: one compares the actual to the ideal, theory suggests how one can 
reduce the discrepancy by using some practical instrument which changes the actual 
conditions, and the process repeats. This particular structure is a cyclic directed graph 
having only dyadic links, but many other structures can be constructed with these four 
terms; structures where three or more terms are linked are called hypergraphs. Bennett's 
systematics does not explore all the graph and hypergraph structures or develop the 
connections between these structures and specific theories in the sciences, but it is an 
'exact metaphysics' that is very suitable for personal use. More recently, the Arica 
school which advertised itself as offering a "technology of consciousness" also taught a 
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theory ("trialectics") organized around non-classical logic and isomorphisms (Hom 1983) 
that is related to systematics. 
Theories in the inner sciences also often include models of the human being that 
cover a wide range - 'from the physiological to the sensory-motor, to the emotional, to the 
rational, and beyond these to the spiritual. The hierarchical scheme of energies given by 
Bennett (1961 ), referred to earlier, is an example of such a model. While a holistic view 
of human function is inconceivable for mainstream science, which cannot integrate 
multiple qualitatively distinct levels of biology and psychology, systems theory has 
always emphasized the importance of "a coarse-grained look at the whole" (Gell-Mann 
1994). Here one sees the price of scientific specialization: there is not today and most 
scientists would say there can never be - any scientific grasp of the human whole that 
spans the above range. But systems-theoretically, this is not an unreasonable aspiration. 
If models offered by the inner sciences could be given mathematical formulations and be 
linked to rich bodies of empirical fact, i.e., if they were part of an 'exact and scientific 
metaphysics,' much coherence would be added to our sense of what it is to be human. 
There are many issues involved in spiritual practice that could be described in 
systems language. There is the need for openness and closedness, interdependence and 
autonomy, commitment and flexibility. External constraint is inescapable, but there can 
be a choice of 'relevant environment'; internal mechanization is lawful, but higher levels 
are less subject to it. There is the possibility of becoming familiar with those external 
and internal forces that govern our states, and the beginnings of freedom are in such 
awareness. There is the search for essence, for uniqueness and universality in oneself and 
others. Unity can be furthered by seeing multiplicity; consistency can emerge by seeing 
contradiction. There is promise and danger in 'higher levels of being,' and opportunity 
and difficulty in relating the highest to the whole. Though the virtual mimics the real, 
objectivity is not completely unattainable. There is the challenge of taking responsibility 
for - even perceiving the externalities of our actions, and the potential of transforming 
self-interest into altruism by expanding 'self and by recognizing both the similarity and 
difference of 'other.' There is the possibility of acceptance of - even gratitude for our 
wholeness and partness, our incompleteness, our finitude. 
One might thus conceive of spiritual practice supported by theory expressed in the 
language of systems laws. Something like this was imagined by Hesse in his Magister 
Ludi (The Glass Bead Game) published in 1943, when the systems movement was just 
beginning to crystallize. Hesse was prescient both in portraying the emergence of a 
systems-oriented (though he did not use this word) world view and the religious potential 
inherent in it. A quote from the book's Foreword makes this explicit: 
"Members of the [Castalian] order must seek to coordinate all the arts and sciences 
into a whole which transcends the sum of the constituent parts; something akin to 
what Robert Bridges, I presume, had in mind, when in 'The Testament of Beauty' he 
wrote of the 'accord of Sense, Instinct, Reason, and Spirit.' For those who attain a 
proficiency in it, [the Glass Bead Game] is raised to the level of a mystic rite, in 
which the acutest mental awareness is coupled with a Yoga-like discipline of 
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meditation. Music - in particul&r the 'pure' music of Bach - and mathematics are 
the foundation stones upon which the whole complicated structure is erected." 
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In his novel, Hesse also expresses the insularity - and thus the limitations and dangers -
of an overdevelopment of the abstract that is insufficiently balanced by the concrete, an 
essence-flaw that too often afflicts both the discourse of spiritual tradition and that of 
systems theory. Imperfection reigns in these domains as well. 
2.4 Summary 
Religion speaks to our emotional nature by employing myth, but insofar as it 
addresses our intellect, it must speak in the language of reason. In the modem era, the 
dominant mode of reason is science. Sacred truths need also to be cast in scientific form. 
The idea of"two magisteriums" (Gould 1999), that is, two kinds of understanding-
religion and science - completely separate from one another, is the counsel of despair. 
More than this is both possible and necessary. Through systems ideas a link between 
science and religion could be made that is substantive and not superficial. It would offer 
more than the mere intellectual fascination that modem physics provides to those who 
browse in its theories. It would provide a meaningful world view, and also connect 
science to the core of religious truth that can be discovered only in practice. 
A productive encounter between modem science and religious tradition would begin 
the recovery of cultural coherence. It would also open up possibilities of communication 
between the different religious traditions by providing a neutral scientific background, as 
it were, for such dialog. Religion wjU never be reconciled with science if it reflects the 
perspective only of one tradition. No aspect of science offers greater support for the 
science-religion dialog and the unity of religion than the systems world view that seeks to 
embrace the whole but does not flinch from the impossibility of doing so. In the recovery 
of old forms of knowledge eclipsed by science, in the establishment of a new connection 
between religious and scientific understanding, in the ingathering of traditions and the 
correction, refinement, and augmentation of the great sacred approximations, systems 
theory and systems metaphysics have important contributions to make. 
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